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their claim to "one-man, one-vote" representation which would have given East Pakistan a majority in the new assembly. The break-up of the Round Table Conference was the penultimate step. On March 25, Ayub told the country that he could no longer carry on as President and that "the whole nation demands that General Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, should fulfill his constitutional responsibilities."7 This is not the place to enumerate the causes of the downfall of Ayub. Many reasons have been put forward ranging from his own faltering health to the consequences of the 1965 conflict with India and encompassing charges of corruption in his regime and favoritism in his family.8 These and other causes can be debated, but one shortcoming pertinent to a discussion of elections was the failure of the Ayub regime to respond to the growing political awareness in the country and the unhappiness with a system that concentrated political-and to an important extent, economic-power in the hands of a relatively small number of persons. Furthermore, the Bengali complaints of unequal treatment were heightened under a constitution which limited them to parity in the legislative branch of government.
The new president moved quickly to restore order and to address fundamental problems facing the nation. The mere announcement of martial law had a sobering effect on those who were still demonstrating. Two urban groups had spearheaded the demonstrations, labor and students. New labor and educational policies were announced. Charges of corruption in the Ayub regime were met with the suspension of 303 civil servants and the subsequent expulsion from the service of the majority of them when their cases were decided. New measures aimed at closer control of the industrial sector by the government were announced. Throughout the martial law period, Yahya maintained touch with the people through four monthly addresses to the nation, generally on the 28th day of the month, which were remarkably frank and more reminiscent of the fireside chats of Roosevelt than the broadcasts of Ayub.
The Martial Law Administration did not ban political parties as in 1958 nor did it introduce restrictive orders similar to EBDO. Open and public political activity was temporarily barred, but was resumed on January By these decisions Yahya went a long way toward meeting some of the existing political grievances. The end of One Unit and of parity took these two questions out of the political debate and instead has brought to the fore the more difficult task of defining the meaning and extent of provincial autonomy.
THE CONTESTANTS
The nine months between the departure of Ayub and the beginning of public political activity were not devoid of private maneuverings and negotiations as the politicians prepared for the election campaign. The "Old Guard" especially in the west wing had been outstripped in the last few months of the Ayub period by the newer, mainly urban and small town, elements who were prepared to take to the streets against Ayub rather than fight political battles in more conventional ways. Now the "Old Guard" prepared to resume its leadership and bring the contest back to the level of political debate and maneuver as practiced before the collapse of 1958. The east wing, too, seemed to be prepared to renew the struggle of 1954 as the Muslim Leagues faced the remnants of the United Front, concentrated now in the Awami League. As it turned out, miscalculations were made in both wings. New elements entered politics and while in East Pakistan they supported an established political party, the Awami League, in the West, they turned to a new leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his People's Party, the one standing for redress of Bengali grievances, the other for the improvement of the lot of the "underprivileged" in both urban and rural areas. The "Islam-Pasands": The term Islam-pasand ("Islam-loving") was used specifically by Pakistan press and public to describe a group of political parties which in varying decrees were seen as religious-oriented and which cooperated to some extent with each other. The grouping here, however, will include some other groups in the religio-political spectrum but which did not cooperate with the others, e.g., the Hazarvi group of the Jamiat-ulUlema. In general terms all of the parties stood for a political, economic and social system rooted in Islam. There were sharp differences of opinion on interpretation of the meaning of an "Islamic system," especially in the economic field, and there were some disagreemnents between the Sunni and Shi'a Islamic sects.
The Jama'at-i-lslami (JI): The best known of the group and one of the best organized parties in Pakistan is the Jama'at-i-Islami led by Maulana Syed Abu Al'a Maudoodi.10 Not unlike other Islam-pasands it was accused by the Muslim Leagues and others of opposing the partition of India. It was attacked by the left on its rigid adherence to Islamic ideology, as Maudoodi sees it. It was painted as supporting an arch-conservative economic system both by the left and by the Hazarvi group of the Jamiat. Organizationally the Jama'at is a closely-knit, well-disciplined group of followers of Maudoodi. It is largely confined to West Pakistan, although the elections showed the party had greater support-in terms of votes received-in East Pakistan than many had suspected. Its appeal is primarily to the middle class in larger cities and small towns, particularly to refugees from India, and has much less strength in rural areas. Karachi, with its greater refugee population, gave greater support to the Jama'at than Lahore, its headquarters. Other than Maudoodi, principal leaders of the party include Professor Ghulam Azam of East Pakistan and Mian Tufail Muhammad of Lahore. During the campaign the Jama'at enlisted the support of some prominent pre-Ayub politicians, such as former Punjab Governor Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, and some retired military officers, including General Umrao Khan.
Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP): The press discussed several attempts at merger of the parties opposed to Ayub, but these failed when the Awami League, CML and Jama'at refused to submerge their programs and identities into a larger party. Many of the potential candidates for a broad merger had experienced one burst of opposition unity when they combined to support Miss Fatima Jinnah in her campaign for the presidency against Ayub and in the legislative elections in 1964-65. They also coordinated to some extent during the Round Table Conference should be used as constituency boundaries as well. Thus, to the extent possible, seats would not cross district boundaries nor would they, for example, straddle a river over which there was no regular crossing available to candidates and election officials. A basic membership of 300 was decided for the National Assembly, giving East Pakistan 162 seats and West Pakistan 138. In addition, 13 women would be elected to the Assembly by vote of the directly elected members, seven from East Pakistan and six from West. The 138 West Pakistan seats were further apportioned among the four new provinces and delimitation completed, hearings held and the final order issued in the Official Gazette. The size of the provincial assemblies was also fixed and a similar procedure followed.
The procedures followed in nomination, scrutiny, security deposit and withdrawal followed those used regularly in parliamentary elections in the Commonwealth. The voting was done on a single paper ballot which was marked by the voter against the name and symbol of the candidate of his choice, folded and placed in the ballot box. Each candidate was assigned a symbol, with each recognized party reserving the use of its symbol for all candidates running with its endorsement. Counting was remarkably quick. Returning officers were instructed to begin the count immediately following the close of the polls and to continue until the results were known. Pakistan radio and television did an outstanding job by staying with the election coverage for upwards of 36 consecutive hours broadcasting reports received from returning stations by telephone, telegraph and wireless.
During the campaign, the leader of each of the recognized parties was invited to use the television and radio facilities-all Government operatedto give a single address explaining his party's program. Each leader accepted in what was a new and educational use of the broadcast system. The press, free of Ayubian restraints, took an active and at times partisan role. Most parties could count on at least one supporter among the newspapers.
The campaign in general-overly long as it exceeded eleven months-was carried on in customary fashion. Party leaders addressed public meetings and toured extensively, although in later stages many found it prudent to work more actively in their own constituencies than to range more widely. Martial law regulations tempered the behavior of the parties and the candidates to some degree, but personal attacks and sensational charges were not absent. Financing apparently was a problem for many candidates who had to draw on their own resources and could not look to national coffers for assistance.
THE RESULTS
As the evening of December 7 passed into night and Radio Pakistan began issuing bulletins on the early returns it soon became clear that the Awami League, as expected, was winning much more than a working majority of the seats in East Pakistan, and that the People's Party was achieving surprisingly strong support in Punjab and Sind. The list of the fallen "Old Guard" included the names of many who were prominent in the fifties while the names of the winners were often unfamiliar to those who listened to the continual outpouring of election data. The leaders of the two parties were eminently successful themselves. Mujib won two resounding victories in Dacca while Bhutto won five of the six seats he contested, including two in Punjab and three in Sind, losing only a seat in the Frontier by a small mar- Bhutto's candidates were by no means all young radicals. Even he drew on landlords-some of the "Punjab Chiefs" category, others of medium status-and in this respect may find resistance to the more socialist sections of his programs. The PPP will also be faced, like the AL, with the inexperience of many of its legislators. In yielding his two seats in the Punjab, to retain one in Sind, Bhutto has chosen more experienced politicians including Mahmud Ali Qasuri in Lahore, perhaps to offset this disadvantage.
The CML, which some had expected to be the largest winner in the Punjab, did achieve second place but with only seven seats. the Sind Provincial Assembly. In the National Assembly poll only Karachi City stood aloof from the PPP tide, but in the provincial election the party fared better in the city. Bhutto won three seats, in Larkana, his home, in Hyderabad and in Thatta. In Larkana he defeated the man once regarded as the "uncrowned king of Sind," former Chief Minister Muhammad Ayub Khuhro.
The pattern of voting differed from that of the Punjab. In Sind outside Karachi the PPP was able to enlist many of the wadera and pir type of traditional leaders on its side. In some cases, it was the younger and personally less conservative members of the key families who looked to the PPP as a political vehicle, but they were nonetheless able to draw on the bradri voting influences of the past. More conservative traditional leaders went to the various Muslim Leagues and with but one exception were defeated in National Assembly contests and did relatively poorly in provincial contests. To some extent, it would appear, the younger elements of traditional families were attracted to the dynamic Sindhi personality who had attained such popularity throughout the west wing.
Karachi, however, presented a different picture. Although within Sind, it is a cosmopolitan, non-Sindhi city in which, among others, refugees from India have a prominent political voice. All of the five National Assembly seats in the heart of the city were won by refugee candidates of Islam-pasand parties (including one supported independent) while the two seats won by the PPP were in more suburban and affluent areas. In Hyderabad city, too, where the refugee population is numerous, an Islamic party candidate won the national seat. The pattern of refugee or non-Sindhi winners was continued in the provincial election, although the PPP took eight of 15 seats in Karachi. Only four of the PPP winners are Sindhis and all of the seven from other parties are refugees. Melding of representatives from rural up-country Sind with those from the Karachi city complex will be a challenge when a provincial administration is formed.
Northwest Frontier: As if to support the comment made above that the Indus Valley districts of the Punjab showed much stronger traditional voting patterns, the westward extension of that area into the Frontier Province also showed similar tendencies. One result was that it, and Baluchistan, did not return a clear majority of seats for any party at either the national or provincial level and the prospects for a future provincial administration are unclear.
Before the polling the main contest appeared to be that between the PML ( Percentages of votes polled by the various parties are, at this writing, only fragmentary and assumptions are subject to later confirmation, when an official election report is published by the Election Commission. It does appear, however, that the turnout in the National Assembly elections was substantial with about 60% reported nationwide, ranging from 69% in Punjab to 40% in Baluchistan.20 There were almost no incidents which would reflect on the conduct of the polling or of the voters. While preliminary figures released quickly to the press had to be adjusted to conform to the official count, only one case was noted where a different winner was shown. Also only one election petition is reported to have been filed and given attention in the press, that for a national seat in Karachi which was won by a very slender margin.
A rather large number of minority candidates contested although the number of those successful was small. In the Sind Provincial Assembly one Hindu was elected from Tharparkar District, the only successful minority 20Dawn, December 19, 1970.
candidate from the west wing. In East Pakistan, however, a Buddhist and a Hindu were elected to National Assembly seats and a number to the provincial legislature. In a close election in East Pakistan the importance of minority voters would be very great under a system of joint electorates. Separate electorates had been a cornerstone of Muslim League policy since before independence and many felt that the system should have been reinstated for these elections. The AL, on the other hand, has favored joint electorates as a matter of policy. Given the choice between a Muslim League and an AL candidate the minority voter would probably be inclined to choose the latter. It is difficult to determine what the voting pattern of minority voters was in these elections, other than to state that in East Pakistan, as almost everyone voted for the AL, it follows that the minority voter did also.
In these elections every party enjoyed the position of being an "out. 
CONCLUSION
The Government of Pakistan, the candidates and the parties, and the people can be justifiably proud that Pakistan's first truly national election was carried out with complete freedom, order, and almost no complaint of irregularity. It is a significant and successful first step toward the restoration of democratic, representative, civilian government in a country which has experienced authoritarian government for so long.
However, it is just the initial step. The next one will be the framing of a constitution which will be generally accepted throughout Pakistan and workable in governing the country. This will not be an easy task and will require a broad spirit of cooperation if the country is to make a success of returning to a democratic system. CRAIG BAXTER is a Foreign Service Officer in the Department of State.
